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Una reciente disputa acerca de los desacuerdos sin falta supone que los desacuer-
dos sobre oraciones evaluativas deben ser entendidos en la misma línea que los desacuer-
dos regulares, fácticos. En lugar de ello, propongo considerar a los desacuerdos 
evaluativos en líneas lewisianas. El uso de lenguaje asemeja un juego gobernado por re-
glas. En él, la aserción de una oración evaluativa es un intento por pasar cierto valor de 
un parámetro evaluativo como el valor por defecto en la conversación; su rechazo, a su 
vez, es en la mayoría de los casos un rechazo a aceptar dicho valor por defecto. 
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ABSTRACT 
A recent quarrel over faultless disagreements assumes that disputes over evaluative 
sentences should be understood as regular, factual disagreements. Instead, I propose that 
evaluative disagreements should be understood in Lewisian terms. Language use works 
like a rule-governed game. In it, the assertion of an evaluative sentence is an attempt to 
establish one value as default in the conversation; its rejection, in turn, is in most cases 
the refusal to accept this move. 
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Consider a dispute over the height of the Eiffel Tower: Anne 
claims it measures 1,000 feet and Bob replies that it does not. Bob is 
right, which means his utterance is true in the actual world and, more 
importantly, that Anne’s is false (in the same world). Such a dispute is 
regular and factual: in it, one of the speakers is mistaken, hence speaking 
falsely, while the other is right. Both utterances show contradictory truth-
values. Does a different kind of dispute – let us call it an evaluative, “fault-
less” dispute – look also like this? In the midst of the debate around fault-
less disagreements, advocates of assessment relativism (truth-relativism1 
MacFarlane style) [MacFarlane (2005), (2007), (2014) and Lasersohn (2005)] 
assume it mostly does: such a dispute is characterized by faultlessness but 
68                                                                                Justina Díaz Legaspe 
 
also by an understanding of disagreement as the utterance of sentences 
with contradictory truth-values. I claim that, unlike regular disputes and 
contrary to what relativists argue, these disagreements are to be explained 
at a pragmatic level. 
Assuming that disagreements over evaluative sentences (sentences 
containing evaluative expressions, like taste predicates among others) 
should be explained in the same way as regular disagreements over factu-
al sentences implies that the rejection involved targets the content of the 
previous utterance because it is taken as false. Disagreements are under-
stood as truth-value contradictions. I will propose instead that certain 
disagreements do not target the expressed content and do not involve ut-
terances with contradictory truth-values. (Most) disagreements involving 
evaluative expressions are evaluative disagreements, which do not target 
the expressed content. Evaluative disagreements are intended as a certain 
kind of pragmatic movement in conversational dynamics that is better 
understood within a framework of language as a rule-governed game. 
 
 
I. OBJECTIVE AND EVALUATIVE JUDGMENTS 
 
Even though it is widely accepted, the distinction between objective 
and evaluative is controversial. For starters, what counts as objective de-
pends on a previous metaphysical view: an ontology accepting values as 
part of the furniture of the (objective) world makes evaluative sentences 
objective. However, from an antirealist perspective – one that rejects 
values as worldly entities – evaluative sentences are not objective. Even 
so, there is no ironclad divide between fact and value. Most evaluative 
judgments rely on facts, and most statements of facts are influenced by 
valuations, making the distinction a matter of degree at most. This being 
said, within an antirealist perspective there is a semantic difference be-
tween objective and evaluative sentences: while objective sentences can be 
context-sensitive (or not), evaluative sentences are necessarily sensitive to 
the way the speaker (or assessor) values the world. Take the following: 
 
1. The average diameter of planet Earth is 7,926 miles. 
 
2. Roller coasters are fun. 
 
The truth-value of (1) depends on the usual parameters of context and 
index canonically featuring values for world and time, plus other parame-
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ters (speaker, location, addressee, demonstratum) when they feature con-
text-sensitive expressions. They fit perfectly in standard double-index 
semantics [see Kaplan (1977), Lewis (1980)]. In turn, (2) is valuation-
sensitive:2 its truth-value will be different for utterances made by speakers 
holding different evaluative standards. A common way to deal with this 
sensitivity is to throw a sui generis parameter into the mixture. Let f be the 
parameter for the standard of fun: 
 
[[Roller coasters are fun.]]c, <wc, fc> = 1 iff roller coasters are fun in wc 
and according to the standard of fun in c.3 
 
I will use the umbrella expression “evaluative sentences” for sentences 
that, like (2), are sensitive to valuations of the world, and can be treated 
under double-index semantics by including a sui generis parameter either 
in the context or in the circumstances of evaluation. Although for the 
sake of simplicity I will focus on sentences containing taste predicates, 
these are not the only nor the most relevant cases of evaluative sentenc-
es. Expressions with similar valuation-sensitivity involve deontic modals, 
deontic predicates and more generally, normative expressions. 
An utterance of any kind of sentence can lead to disagreement: i.e. a 
dispute in which two or more parties entertain opposite attitudes or in-
compatible practical intentions towards the same object. Paradigmatic 
disagreements happen in face-to-face conversations in which one of the 
parties rejects what the other party expresses by means of a felicitous 
contentious answer. The difference between evaluative and objective 
sentences amounts to a difference in kinds of disagreement: 
 
3. John: The average diameter of planet Earth is 7,925 miles. 
   Mary: No, it’s not! It’s actually 7,926 miles. 
 
4. Jack: Roller coasters are fun. 
   Jill: No, they are not! They are very unpleasant. 
 
Disagreements can be intuitively sorted into weak and strong: we expect 
weak disagreements to be resolved easily by resorting to available data, 
while in strong disagreements the agreement on a description of the rel-
evant facts is, in most cases, not enough reason to make the parties con-
verge. Blackburn (1981) associates weak disagreement to objective topics 
and strong disagreements to aesthetic, moral or personal taste topics. Con-
sider also Rott’s (2014) distinction between substantive disputes (where re-
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traction happens) and merely verbal (faultless) disputes, corresponding to 
weak and strong disagreements respectively. This natural sorting squares 
nicely with the distinction between disagreements over objective and 
evaluative sentences: intuitively, if John were presented with accurate as-
tronomical information, he would retract his utterance. However, seldom 
can information about roller coasters force Jack to stop enjoying them.4 
From now on, I will call disagreements over objective sentences “objec-
tive disagreements”. Disagreements over evaluative sentences can also be 
objective (more on this below), but are in most cases “evaluative disa-
greements”. I will claim that, unlike objective disagreements, they are 
best understood as refusals to accept a certain value for an evaluative pa-
rameter as default in a conversation. 
 
 
II EVALUATIVE DISPUTES AS REGULAR DISAGREEMENTS 
 
In disagreements, rejection targets something: in most cases, it targets 
contents either semantically expressed or otherwise conveyed. I will call 
regular those disagreements in which the target of the rejection is the se-
mantically (or pragmatically) expressed content. In them, the second ut-
terance expresses the proposition that no p whenever the first utterance 
expresses that p (or vice versa).5 No matter how this rejection is stated, it is 
based on truth-value contradiction: the rejection is felicitous due to these 
contradictory truth-values, while the main motivation for it is a need to 
correct. 
Clearly, objective disagreements fit perfectly into this model. In 
them, both utterances are assigned contradictory truth-values and one 
speaker is at fault. Underlying this is that, when it comes to statement of 
facts, the same input of data and the same inferential processing should 
result in the same (true) content: considering the same evidence and ar-
riving at a false content evinces a fault either in data gathering or in its 
processing. The main motivation to disagree is consequently to correct 
these mistakes. 
In a recent debate over faultless disagreements – disagreements involv-
ing sentences with taste predicates and other evaluative expressions – 
advocates of assessment relativism have proposed an argument against 
contextualism that assumes that evaluative disagreements share most of 
the traits of regular disagreements. Disagreements over the taste of an 
ice-cream flavor, for example, are intuitively faultless, for none of the 
parties seems to be at fault in their valuation of flavors, and at the same 
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time, they are, intuitively, disagreements. In the debate, assessment rela-
tivism claims to be the only theory capable of accounting for this phe-
nomenon. The general structure of the argument can be found in 
MacFarlane’s (2007) and Lasersohn’s (2005) arguments against contextu-
alism for taste predicates, MacFarlane’s argument against Kratzer’s con-
textualist semantics for epistemic modals and Egan’s (2012) argument 
against contextualist treatments of value terms, amongst others. Accord-
ing to contextualism, an evaluative sentence ϕ is sensitive to an evalua-
tive parameter within, or initialized in, the context of utterance. Hence, 
[[ϕ]]c,I = 1 iff ϕ as uttered in c is true in ic. According to the relativist ar-
gument, this cannot explain rejection in cases of disagreement.6 Non-
indexical contextualism (which locates evaluative parameters in the cir-
cumstances of evaluation) assigns true to each utterance in its corre-
sponding circumstance of evaluation. Therefore, disagreement cannot be 
explained: the circumstance at the context of use is the one needed for 
the evaluation of an utterance (even from a different context), and ac-
cording to non-indexical contextualism, the utterance of ϕ is true relative 
to circumstance of evaluation c1 and ¬ϕ is true relative to circumstance 
of evaluation c2. Therefore, non-indexical contextualism cannot explain 
the disagreement involving ϕ and ¬ϕ. 
In turn, indexical contextualism (according to which parameters oc-
cupy an argument-place in the proposition expressed) claims that each 
utterance expresses a different proposition; not ϕ and ¬ϕ, but some-
thing more like ϕ and ψ. Hence, the parties would be technically talking 
past each other. The dialogue cannot be considered a case of disagree-
ment. For this reason, indexical contextualism is also accused of being 
unable to account for our intuitions regarding these exchanges. 
All of these theories assume that rejection only makes sense if there 
is a contradiction in truth-values. Assessment relativists argue that the 
truth-values of utterances are sensitive to an assessor a. [[ϕ]]c,<wc,tc>is 
construed now as [[ϕ]]c,<wc,tc>, a.7 Thus, ϕ gets its truth-value from the as-
sessment of the semantic content expressed in context c in the context 
of assessment a. Therefore, the first party’s utterance will come out as 
false according to the second party’s (the assessor’s) evaluative parame-
ter, explaining the exchange as a case of regular disagreement. 
There is, of course, a number of responses to this pro-relativist ar-
gument. Among them, some advocates of contextualism presuppose the 
same conception of disagreements as objective [(López de Sa (2007), 
(2008), Sundell (2011), Stojanovic (2007), Egan (2010) and Parsons (2013)]. 
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According to one of these rebuttals due to López de Sa, evaluative predi-
cates trigger a presupposition of commonality of evaluative parameters that leads 
the rejecting party to assume that everyone in the conversation shares 
her own parameter. The rejected utterance comes out as false under the 
presupposition and it is then a proper object of rejection.8 Thus, the 
structure of content-disagreement is mimicked at the presuppositional 
level: there is no contradiction in the truth-values ascribed to the utter-
ances, so the contradiction is built into the presupposition. 
Assessment relativism and some of its contextualist rivals alike as-
sume that evaluative disagreements should be treated as a special kind of 
regular disagreement. However, this assumption leaves some cases of 
disagreement unexplained. The presuppositionalist strategy leaves in the 
dark cases in which both parties are fully aware from the beginning of 
their different standards and this does not prevent them from engaging 
in a discussion, and also cases where the conversation does not cease 
when they learn that their standards are different.9 Once the presupposi-
tion of commonality is out of the picture, so is the motivation to correct. 
Advocates of presuppositionalism should not discard these disputes as 
irrelevant without independent justification. The relativist strategy, in 
turn, assumes that a dispute is a relevant disagreement when the content 
expressed by one of the utterances is rejected. According to presupposi-
tionalism, disagreements involve a contradiction in truth-values, which 
explains rejection.10 According to assessment relativism, a speaker rejects 
her interlocutor’s claim because it is false under the standards in her con-
text of assessment. However, as competent speakers and users of evalua-
tive expressions, interlocutors should be aware that the rejected claim is 
only false under their own standards, but not under the speaker’s original 
standards. If so, the rejection seems somewhat limited. Most likely, Jill is 
well aware of the fact that Jack’s claim is true for him, and that it could 
have been stated by saying “Roller coasters are fun for me”.11 Add to this 
the fact that a competent speaker also knows intuitively that, according 
to the norms of assessment, one should only assert what one thinks is 
true. Hence, anyone would know that what a conversational party says is 
true according to their standards as much as what one says is true ac-
cording to one’s own. Why would we argue in these cases? The motiva-
tion to correct does not seem to be at stake here. The fact that our 
interlocutor is not right under our lights does not mean that he is mis-
taken (think in cases in which someone expresses his preference for an 
ice-cream flavor we find repulsive).12 The point can be reinforced by 
what real speakers do in disagreements involving evaluative terms: if 
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questioned whether an utterance of (2) is true, a competent speaker 
would answer affirmatively – provided she is informed of the attitudes of 
the speaker towards roller coasters – and negatively if forced to accept it 
– provided she does not like them.13 
In order to explain the motivation to reject, relativizing truth-values 
to contexts of assessment is not enough. On this regard, MacFarlane 
(2007), p. 30, adds that the motive underlying these discussions is the 
need to coordinate contexts. The bigger the interest in context coordination, 
the stronger the disposition to engage in a discussion. Nevertheless, the 
expression “context coordination” is vague enough to allow at least two 
readings. A concessive reading assumes that context coordination is 
achieved only when both parties abandon their own perspectives in or-
der to build together a different one; a stubborn reading assumes that con-
text coordination happens when one of the parties manages to convince 
the other of abandoning her original perspective and adopt theirs in-
stead. I think that MacFarlane is assuming the concessive reading in his 
claim. If this is so, I disagree: this understanding of context coordination 
does not reflect accurately the motivation to engage in a discussion in 
cases in which we are not willing to abandon our initial position or per-
spective. Coordination-motivated discussions would be impossible with-
out a previous disposition to relinquish our evaluative standard in favor 
of a new, common one.14 In most cases of evaluative disagreement, this 
disposition is not present. However, in what follows I will accept that the 
motivation to engage in a discussion corresponds to the stubborn read-
ing of context coordination, where the speakers intend to correct or 
convince their interlocutors into adopting their own initial perspectives. 
None of the attitudes I will mention below are closed to the relativist, if 
he decides to adopt this stubborn reading of context coordination.15 
 
 
III. EVALUATIVE DISAGREEMENTS 
 
Understanding disputes over evaluative sentences as evaluative disa-
greements will hopefully explain what is left a mystery when they are con-
strued as regular disagreements. Regular disagreements target contents. 
Evaluative disagreements, in turn, target the commitment of the speaker 
to a particular evaluative standard. Recall that evaluative sentences are 
valuation-sensitive: truth-values of their utterances are determined by a 
sui generis evaluative parameter (say, t for the standard of taste): 
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[[Beets are disgusting.]]c, <wc, tc> = 1 iff beets are disgusting in wc and 
according to the standard of taste in c.16 
 
Now consider this disagreement: 
 
5. Kid: Beets are disgusting. 
    Mother: No, they are not. Eat them. 
 
There are two ways of understanding (5). Either it could be a case of 
regular disagreement, where Mother and Kid disagree over the content of 
the sentence (semantically or pragmatically expressed), or it could be an 
evaluative disagreement, where something else happens. If the former is 
the case, Mother is correcting Kid (meaning that Kid does like beets). In 
this case, (5) counts as a regular disagreement where Kid misapplies his 
own taste standards. That is, the conversation features one value for the sa-
lient taste parameter in the context (Kid’s standard), and the content ex-
pressed by Kid’s utterance is false under it. Another possible reading in 
this line takes a pragmatically conveyed content as the target of the rejec-
tion. In this case, what Mother wants is to block the implicature that Kid 
will not eat the beets, but she does it by denying the content of Kid’s ut-
terance. So, it is the semantic content that is targeted, but with an asser-
tion. Thus, this reading also construes the case as an instance of a regular 
disagreement.  
The dialogue can be interpreted also as a case of an evaluative disa-
greement: in this reading, the target of Mother’s rejection is not the con-
tent of her son’s utterance, which is true from his perspective. What she 
is denying is the possibility of finding beets disgusting in that conversa-
tional context. In other words, she is not rejecting the content expressed 
by Kid’s utterance but the taste standard that would make it true, or, 
more precisely, the conversational commitment to the taste standard that 
would make it true. What she wants is to make it clear to her son that the 
conversational context in which they are both involved does not admit a 
standard of taste that valuates beets as disgusting. Hence, cases of appar-
ent regular disagreement can be understood as something else; even if 
there are cases that can be read in both ways, as this one, most cases of 
disagreements over evaluative sentences are best understood as evalua-
tive disagreements. 
An evaluative disagreement, thus, is a disagreement whose target is 
not the content of the assertion but a value for some parameter imposed 
by the assertion of the questioned sentence. In turn, the felicitousness of 
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the rejection is not to be explained appealing to contradictory truth-
values (for both utterances might be true and/or be acknowledged as 
true relative to the speaker) but to certain traits of the pragmatic dynam-
ics of the conversation. The semantics of the evaluative terms provide us 
with a clue for understanding these disputes as evaluative disagreements. 
But how should we understand the latter? 
Evaluative standards, closely linked to the figure of the speaker, are 
part of the conversational context. Context can be construed in several 
ways. In double-index semantics, what is loosely called “context” is under-
stood in terms of a list of contextual parameters that fix (or help fixing) 
semantic content and that is articulated in “context” and “circumstances” 
[Kaplan (1977)] or “context” and “index” [Lewis (1980)], accounting re-
spectively for the content expressed by the sentence and for the truth-
value of utterances of sentences containing intensional operators. Other 
perspectives on context see it as the common ground in a conversation. 
According to Stalnaker (1978), (1999), (2014), the common ground is 
depicted in terms of iterated propositional attitudes. For Lewis (1979), in 
turn, context equals to the scoreboard of a norm-governed game (lan-
guage use), registering every change in it; the common ground is just one 
component of this score.  
From each notion of context, a different treatment of context-
sensitivity ensues. According to the former, sensitivity is treated by 
means of positing variables within the logical form of the sentence that 
take their values from contextual parameters (for traditional context-
sensitive expressions), or by positing new parameters in the index. Ac-
cording to the common ground perspective, sensitivity can be under-
stood either in terms of presuppositions or in terms of different 
components of the score. Of these three options, I will frame my pro-
posal within the third, Lewisian perspective. The first notion of context 
is useful for the analysis of isolated sentences, but it is not as good to ex-
plain the dynamics of a conversation. In contrast, any of the two com-
mon ground perspectives would do the trick, but I will prefer the 
Lewisian perspective to avoid talking about possible worlds. The Stal-
nakerian framework imposes a propositional form on presuppositions – 
i.e. they have to be objects of belief and acceptance. Propositions, in 
turn, are understood here as sets of possible worlds. A valuation-
sensitive sentence divides the set of possible worlds into those in which 
the proposition is true (where the referred to object, event, etc. is valuat-
ed positively) and those where it is false (where it is valuated negatively). 
(Very) roughly, asserting the sentence attempts to eliminate the last 
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worlds from the context set; whereas rejecting the assertion restores 
these worlds to the context set. Despite its clarity, this framework re-
quires us to go through possible worlds to pay due attention to what 
happens to the value of the evaluative parameter. The Lewisian score, on 
the other hand, accepts different kinds of components, some of which 
are not propositional like permissibility boundaries, salience rankings, 
standards of precision, etc. Within this framework, valuation-sensitivity 
is to be explained as the dependence of the truth-values of the utterance 
of evaluative sentences on the value given to a certain parameter in the 
score.17 In what follows, I choose this approach over the rest. 
The Lewisian framework assimilates language use to a rule-
governed game in which every use of language18 is considered a move in 
the game. As in some rule-governed games, there is a board carrying the 
score of all the moves made by the speakers and the way they affect the 
game.  This score includes not only a set of contents accepted as true by 
all the participants, but also a number of parameters that get particular 
values. For every time t, the score involves different values for these dif-
ferent parameters. The value given to each parameter helps determine 
the truth-value of the utterance, but also plays a role in their acceptance. 
Assertions, paradigmatic moves in the language game, update the com-
mon ground by adding the content they express to it every time the au-
dience accepts them as true. For some assertions, in order for them to be 
accepted as true and consequently update the common ground, both 
speaker and audience must implicitly assume that a particular parameter 
of the score has a determinate value. An utterance of, say, “The queen is 
dancing” is true only if the value given to a time parameter corresponds 
to the time of utterance, say t – and if there is only a queen salient in the 
context that is dancing at t. The acceptance of the assertion as true by 
the audience carries with it the implicit acceptance of t as the value for 
the time parameter (that is, t is implicitly accepted as the proper value to 
assess the truth-value of the utterance). Only if t is the value for the time 
parameter of the score relevant in that conversation, the sentence assert-
ed can be accepted as true. For each time and each utterance, the values 
given to the relevant parameters change according to constitutive rules and 
rules of accommodation. According to the rule of accommodation, the au-
dience can accept an assertion even when the relevant parameter does 
not exhibit the adequate value, insofar they are willing to change the cur-
rent value for the value that would make the utterance true. If the asser-
tion of “The queen is dancing” requires the value given to the time 
parameter to be t, but was t’ before the assertion, the audience can ac-
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commodate in such a way as to make t instead of t’ the value for it at the 
moment of assertion.  
In this layout, the assertion of a valuation-sensitive sentence is also 
a move within the language game that imposes a certain value for an 
evaluative parameter in order both to make the utterance true and be ac-
cepted as true. As with other sentences, this value can be accommodat-
ed. To see more clearly how this works, consider an utterance of (6) 
from a contextualist framework: 
 
6. Juan is tall. 
 
Assume that in order for (6) to be true, a parameter for tallness must be 
given certain value – i.e. a comparison class – in the score. It is the case 
that [[ Juan is tall]]c,<w,pc>= 1 iff Juan’s height is significantly greater than, 
say, what is typical for an average Spanish teenager, where pc stands for 
the comparison class to determine what counts as tall within context c; 
the value of pc that makes (6) true being AVERAGE SPANISH TEENAGER, 
say. The aim of the assertion of (6) is to update the common ground 
with its content. This only happens if the audience accepts the utterance 
as true. And in order for (6) to be accepted as true, AVERAGE SPANISH 
TEENAGER must be the value of the parameter (pc) determining what 
counts as tall in the score at the moment of acceptance.19 If the classifi-
cation of Juan as tall were false according to the value of (pc) at the mo-
ment of utterance (that is, if the value of pc were BASKETBALL PLAYER 
instead), this value should change to make (6) true (going from 
BASKETBALL PLAYER to AVERAGE SPANISH TEENAGER as the value ac-
cepted for pc in the conversation). This would be a case of accommoda-
tion in a Lewisian sense:  
 
If an assertion A made at time t requires any component s of the conversational 
score to have value v for A to be true or otherwise acceptable, and if s does not 
have v as a value before t, then at t s takes v. 
 
Hence, the assertion of context sensitive sentences could aim either to 
update the common ground with the content it expresses, or to change a 
given value of a component of the score via accommodation. 
This particular kind of context-sensitivity does not differ from the 
valuation-sensitivity of evaluative sentences. In this case, the sui generic 
evaluative parameter is also a component of the conversational score. 
Each assertion of an evaluative sentence is a pragmatic move potentially 
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altering the score. Given a certain value for the standard of fun in the 
score at t, an utterance of (2) is true for both conversational parties. If 
not, the value can be accommodated as to make it true at t. 
This affects the way in which rejection of evaluative sentences 
should be understood. Rejecting the assertion of an objective sentence is 
refusing to accept its content as part of the common ground. In turn, re-
jecting the assertion of an evaluative sentence could amount either to re-
jecting its content or to refusing to accept the value it tries to impose on 
a certain component of the score, a refusal to conduct the accommoda-
tion. In (4) Jill’s rejection does not target the expressed content but the 
standard of fun that Jack’s utterance is forcing as the value of the param-
eter of fun in the score. In other words, Jill refuses to trace a boundary 
that classifies roller coasters as fun. Whenever the sentence involves the 
special kind of context sensitivity we are considering, its content can only 
be accepted if the value of the parameter is fixed (not in question) and it 
is the value accepted by the speaker. In evaluative disagreements, the 
value of the relevant parameter is not settled, and therefore there is a ne-
gotiation going on over the value of the parameter.  
The rejection of a particular value for an evaluative parameter is 
motivated by our attitudes towards it. People holding different values 
valuate things in different ways. Moreover, everybody can entertain valua-
tions over other people’s valuations: I can judge that your notion of what is 
funny, different from mine, is lousy or silly. According to Richard (2008), 
pp. 129-130, we can find four commonsensical attitudes towards another 
person’s valuations: agreeing with them (e.g. on what is funny), accepting 
them (e.g. if I find your sense of humor good enough), finding them defi-
cient (e.g. if I take it that your sense of humor is worse than mine) or 
finding them unacceptable (e.g. if I find it reprehensible). Only the two last 
lead to voice disagreement. The difference between them is subtle, main-
ly because they both aim to convince the speaker to abandon his/her 
commitment to one value for the parameter for another. But they are 
different enough when they are considered from an individual/universal 
perspective: if deficient, a valuation held by other is worse than one’s own 
but universally acceptable; if unacceptable, nobody should accept it, not 
even oneself. Note that the aim is different (albeit only slightly) from the 
concessive reading of context coordination. Motivations to reject in 
evaluative disagreement differ in the reason why the speaker should jettison 
his/her own standard. Evaluative mistakes happen when we find our con-
tender’s evaluative parameter unacceptable, and embracing it, a mistake 
that we will want to correct by reasoning the speaker into adopting a new 
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standard. In turn, whenever we think the speaker has not committed any 
kind of mistake but we still feel that our standard is preferable, we feel 
the urge to convince her of changing it. Note that considering the standard 
deficient does not mean or implies that it is mistaken (nor that we think it 
is so); we acknowledge her standard but we still think there is a better 
way of valuing. Thus, correcting and convincing are the main motivations be-
hind the rejection of an evaluative utterance: the former is linked to atti-
tudes of unacceptability towards other people’s valuation and the latter, 
to attitudes of finding that valuation deficient.  
Consider the possible attitudes I could have towards an utterance 
of “The Simpsons is funny” by Mary: 
 
(a) Deficiency: According to my standards, the show is not funny but 
I do not see any harm if others find it funny. Even so, 
I feel motivated to convince Mary that it is not funny. 
 
(b) Unacceptability: I not only find the show not funny, I find it in-
sulting for some reason (and consequently I think 
that no one should find it funny). I feel motivated 
to correct Mary. 
 
This layout applies to sentences with taste predicates. With minor adjust-
ments, it could extend to sentences with deontic and normative expres-
sions. Consider Barbara’s utterance of “Smoking pot is perfectly right”: 
 
(a) Deficiency: I do not use drugs, but I accept that, among all kinds 
of drugs, pot has the mildest effects and is the most 
socially acceptable. Therefore, I do not see any harm 
in Barbara’s attitude towards pot. However, I feel mo-
tivated to convince her not to use drugs at all. 
 
(b) Unacceptability: I do not use drugs, and I think that any kind of drug 
distorts perception and damages brain cells, even 
those that do it in a small degree. Therefore I think 
that no one should use drugs, not even pot. I feel 
motivate to correct Barbara out of her opinion.  
 
Of course, unacceptability does not seem to be very common in disputes 
involving taste disagreements,20 but it could be in disputes involving, say, 
normative expressions or deontic modals. Deficiency will be more com-
mon in disputes about taste and maybe aesthetics.  
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IV. WHY TAKE THIS PATH? 
 
Under the lights of the Lewisian framework, evaluative disagree-
ments are no more than attempts to reject the imposition of some value 
of a component of the score via accommodation. The rejection is not 
aimed at the content, but at the speaker’s move of passing as default a 
certain value for a score component. Framing evaluative disagreements 
in this way allows us to understand them better. Recall Jill’s explanation 
of her rejection of Jack’s claim by appealing to relativized sentences: “He 
said that roller coasters are fun for him and they are unpleasant for me”. 
The rejection cannot be explained in terms of truth-value contradiction, 
for in this case Jack´s utterance is perfectly true (from his perspective). 
Within the Lewisian account, the rejection is due to the refusal to let a 
certain value pass as default in the common context. If this is the case, 
Jill’s relativized explanation is adequate: she refuses to take Jack´s stand-
ards of fun to rule over roller coasters. 
Compare this to a similar case involving gradable adjectives like 
“tall”. Mother and Father talk about their son. Mother claims that he is 
tall (with son’s classmates in mind) while Father says that he is not tall at 
all (with basketball players in mind). In this scenario, this conversation is 
perfectly plausible: 
 
Mother: Max is tall. 
 
Father: No, he is not tall. / He is tall, but he is not really tall.  
 
Mother: What do you mean? Max is tall compared to the rest of his 
classmates. 
 
Father: That is true. But he is short for a basketball player. 
 
Father can reject Mother’s opinion by claiming that Max “is tall, but he is 
not really tall”. Although the sentence may sound contradictory if inter-
preted literally, the focus makes it clear that Father is not rejecting the 
content of Mother’s utterance (he may actually agree with it), but her 
choice of the relevant comparison class. Both uses of “tall” are semanti-
cally compatible (Max can be tall in both senses), but only one of the 
comparison classes should be at work in the common background.21 
This kind of conversation is implausible when it involves non-evaluative 
sentences, where truth-value contradiction prevents one speaker from ad-
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mitting the truth of the other assertion. The same kind of conversation 
makes perfect sense in discussions involving evaluative sentences, though: 
 
Jack: Roller coasters are fun. 
 
Jill: No, they are not fun at all. 
 
Jack: Well, they are fun for me. 
 
Jill: That is true. But they are not fun for me. 
 
In this case, Jill is not rejecting Jack’s utterance’s content, but the fact 
that he chooses his own evaluative standard as relevant in the context. 
Note that this explanation is perfectly fine for cases in which the speaker 
is aware from the beginning of the divergence of standards. 
It can be objected that all the theories on the topic, including mine, 
find it difficult to explain why people who are aware of their difference 
in standards disagree or continue to disagree, without deeming such 
speakers as irrational. This is certainly true, but even so, I find a differ-
ence between assessment relativism and my proposal here. Relativists 
have two tools at their disposal to account for this phenomenon: the fact 
that the utterance in dispute is false according to the assessor’s standards, 
and his intention to coordinate contexts. The first, I have argued, is in-
sufficient for explaining the phenomenon; the explanation only ensues 
from its combination with the second. However, there are two ways to 
understand the coordinative intention, and I suspect that MacFarlane’s is 
not completely adequate for this task for it requires the assessor’s will-
ingness to relinquish his standard. My proposal, instead, understands the 
assertion of evaluative sentences as an attempt to impose the value given 
to an evaluative parameter (when it’s not common), and disagreement as 
a way to avoid this imposition. Here, too, the work is only done by com-
bining both tools, but in this case what is rejected is the fact that the val-
ue is presented as common: with her assertion, the first speaker poses a 
commonality (by default, it is assumed that both interlocutors subscribe 
to the value). The second speaker rejects this commonality, refusing to 
be treated as someone who subscribes to it. 
Now, one might wonder why people keep behaving as if they were 
objecting to the content expressed by the evaluative assertion. That is, 
why do they say “No, licorice is not tasty” or “That’s not true” instead of 
talking directly about standards? Here too these assertions are to be un-
derstood as moves imposing a certain value for the evaluative parameter, 
and therefore rejecting indirectly the parameter assumed by the other 
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speaker’s utterance. But why do speakers choose to do this indirectly in-
stead of saying things such as “I don’t agree with your taste standard”? 
Here is a thought: this is probably as direct a way of speaking about our 
standards as is possible. Let us figure how evaluative standards work. A 
taste standard could be construed as a function from objects to valua-
tions,22 ideally assigning a valuation for any given object in the domain. 
From a third-person perspective, we only have partial epistemic access to 
them via the explicit valuation others assign to the object mentioned in 
the evaluative sentence (“Licorice is tasty” is true from a taste standard 
assigning a positive valuation to licorice). This is enough though to de-
tect a divergence with our own standard (which, say, assigns a negative 
valuation to licorice). Asserting that licorice is not tasty amounts to ex-
pressing that our standards are different. 
A Lewisian understanding of evaluative disagreements, not based in 
truth-values or semantically expressed content, explains the linguistic be-
havior of speakers: if the dialogue involves an evaluative disagreement, 
both utterances can be true and the rejection will be felicitous even so. 
The content of the speaker’s utterance is not denied; it is only the value it 
implicitly imposes to a certain contextual component that is found ques-
tionable. From the Lewisian perspective, the rejection of the value im-
posed by the assertion comes before its evaluation; the only thing needed 
to explain the rejection is this anti-accommodation rule: 
 
Anti-Accommodation Rule: If an assertion A made at time t requires any 
component s of the conversational score to have a value v for A to be true or oth-
erwise acceptable, and if s does not have v as its value before t, and if the audi-
ence is not willing to accept v as a value for s; then v is rejected at t´ as an 
adequate value for s. 
 
If such a rule finds its place in the Lewisian framework, evaluative disa-
greements will be best understood, in most cases, as guided by it. Con-
sidering evaluative disputes as cases of evaluative disagreement and not 
as cases of regular disagreement gestures towards a better understanding 
of the expressions involved. 
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1 There are two canonical ways of distinguishing between relativism and 
contextualism. According to Egan (2012), relativism locates the evaluative pa-
rameter outside the context, either in the circumstances of evaluation or in the 
context of assessment; in both cases, the content of ϕ remains parameter-
neutral. Contextualists, instead, place it in the context, so that it enters into the 
content of ϕ (in the same way as the semantic values of indexicals). According 
to MacFarlane (2014), contextualism initiates the evaluative parameter in the 
context, and consequently there are two kinds of contextualism: indexical – 
placing it inside the context – and non-indexical contextualism – placing it in the 
circumstances of evaluation. Relativism, instead, initiates it in the context of as-
sessment. Here I will follow MacFarlane’s classification. 
2 This kind of sensitivity should not be confused with the traditional con-
text-sensitivity of indexicals, that (a) get their values from the usual parameters 
in the context (agent, time, location), and (b) cannot be located in any place oth-
er than the context of utterance. Cappelen & Hawthorne (2009), p. 54, propose 
the following test for traditional context-sensitivity: let u be a sincere utterance 
of (a sentence) S by (a subject) A in (a context) C and u’ a sincere utterance of 
not-S by (a second subject) B in (a second context) C’. If from a third context 
C’’ they cannot be correctly reported by saying ‘A and B disagree whether S’, 
then S is semantically context-sensitive. According to this test, evaluative sen-
tences like (2) are not context sensitive. But an utterance of (2) by different 
speakers may get different truth-values, depending on their evaluation standards. 
For this reason, I will refer to them as valuation-sensitive. 
3 This articulation corresponds to what is called “non indexical contextual-
ism” [see López de Sa (2007)]. Another possible articulation corresponds to in-
dexical contextualism: [[Roller coasters are fun.]]<w, f>, i = 1 iff roller coasters are fun 
in wc and according to the standard of fun in c. Note that in this case the stand-
ard of taste is located within the context of utterance; “fun” behaves here pretty 
much as an indexical, and the value of the standard enters into the content. 
4 This is not to say that no factual information can alter evaluative judg-
ments. On occasion, adding information can alter a previous evaluative judg-
ment due to non-evaluative reasons: a morally induced vegan can suddenly reject 
her previously favorite cookies once she learns that they contain animal fat. She 
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will still find them tasty, but she will reject them for the same reasons she rejects 
meat. This means that the new information leads to a change in attitude but not 
to a change in evaluative judgment (the vegan will still find the cookie delicious, 
she will just choose not to eat it). My claim above should be understood in this 
sense. It is possible to alter an evaluative judgment for evaluative reasons: I might 
find the use of some derogatory terms funny until I learn about the harm that 
using them might cause to some people, and start finding them not so funny 
from that point on. My point is not to deny this second kind of influence of 
facts over evaluative judgments, but to point out that it is not as straightforward 
as with objective sentences. This influence (or the lack of it) should not be un-
derstood as a criterion for the objective versus evaluative nature of sentences. 
The divide between objective and subjective sentences is not categorical, and I 
can only hope the reader will acknowledge a difference of degree between (1) and 
(2). I thank one of the anonymous referees of this journal for this point. 
5 Although this is the more widespread case, “regular” disagreement can 
also be expressed by uttering sentences that are not contradictory, but contrary – 
for example, when an utterance expresses a content whose negation is entailed 
by the content of the other utterance, as in “Around here only doughnuts are 
tasty. / No, marshmallows are tasty too.” In order to simplify, I will leave the 
latter aside, but the same ideas presented here can apply to them with minor ad-
justments: all you need to do is understand the second assertion as a way of im-
posing a value t2 to the evaluative parameter in the score different from the t1 
value imposed by the first assertion. 
6 At least not cases of relevant evaluative disagreement: according to 
MacFarlane (2014), only those presenting a preclusion of joint accuracy are of inter-
est, since they oppose contextualist and relativist theories. Contextualism can 
only explain, at most, disagreements with non-cotenable beliefs or attitudes. 
7 This is a rough, general approximation: a correct articulation of assess-
ment relativism would be different for sentences with taste predicates and for 
sentences with deontic modals. The details are not significant here. 
8 A similar strategy, but appealing to communitarian evaluative parameters 
has been offered by Huvenes (2012) and Recanati (2007), among others. 
9 See Marques and García-Carpintero (2014). 
10 An anonymous referee points out that the relativist challenge can be 
launched even if believing/asserting contradictory proposition is a sufficient, 
and not a necessary, condition for disagreement. True, disagreement as contra-
diction is not the only notion of disagreement in the literature. Relativists should 
(and in most cases do) accept disagreements in attitudes. However, disagree-
ment as contradiction will be of interest here because it is presented by relativ-
ists as what contextualism cannot account for. See MacFarlane (2014), ch. 6. 
11 This is not to say that the content of Jack’s utterance is the relativized 
sentence: it is so for indexical, but not for non-indexical contextualism. Howev-
er, both should accept the paraphrase as correct. 
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12 It could be argued that mistakes that are not objective are still mistakes, 
even though they are mistakes from one’s point of view. I will follow this line 
below (following Richard in considering an evaluative standard deficient). Howev-
er, at this point I am referring to objective mistakes, that is, mistakes from any 
point of view. 
13 According to the experimental results attained by Knobe and Yalcin 
(2014), speakers reject these assertions even if they find their content true. Their re-
sults concerned sentences containing epistemic modals, though. To my knowledge, 
there is no similar experiment regarding the usage of evaluative sentences. 
14 An anonymous referee wonders what a commonly built standard could be, 
if it is not my standard or yours, now shared by both of us. I share this qualm 
but direct it towards MacFarlane’s idea of a need to “coordinate contexts” be-
cause of an evaluative disagreement. I take it that in such a case, according to 
MacFarlane, both speakers end up agreeing on a new way of valuating a certain 
item, but this is confusing to say the least. For this reason, my proposal does not 
appeal to new standards but to the adoption of mine or yours. 
15 An anonymous referee (to whom I am grateful for remarks about this 
passage) questions whether convincing an interlocutor of adopting your own 
standard can be done (or better done) by simply insisting that what they say is 
false, or indeed whether an attempt to change their standards is needed. Even 
though the second option seems better, the referee points out that this does not 
mean that there is no disagreement, in the sense of contradictory propositions. 
On the face of it, the referee argues, both disagreement in content and disa-
greement in setting the values of elements in the conversational score go hand 
in hand: both projects are compatible (relativists could use a Stalnakerian or 
Lewisian model, see Egan (2012)). I agree with part of this remark: there are in-
deed disagreements over the content expressed by an evaluative sentence. And 
insisting on the falsity of what is said by someone may motivate him to make 
adjustments. But, the way I see it, this is restricted to a particular kind of mis-
take: misapplication. A content is false relative to a perspective; what is said by 
the speaker is false if he is misapplying his own standard or, in a relativistic 
framework, his assessor’s standard. More likely, the misapplication will be cor-
rected by adjusting the valuation to what the standard dictates, but seldom will it 
motivate the abandonment of the standard held by the speaker.  
16 Or its indexical version: [[Beets are disgusting.]]<w, t>, i = 1 iff beets are dis-
gusting in wc and according to the standard of taste in c. 
17 These observations do not aim to criticize the Stalnakerian or Kaplanian 
notions of concepts; both are equally useful for different purposes. They merely 
explain the motivation for preferring the Lewisian framework for these cases. 
18 Not every use: in soliloquy, scoreboards seem of less utility for sure. But 
we can always think of this kind of language use as derivative relative to dialogue. 
19 See Von Fintel (2008) and Stalnaker (2014) for the timing of accommo-
dation. 
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20 It could be argued that disagreement on whether dolphins or dogs are 
tasty exemplify exactly that. I am not denying that disputes based on unaccepta-
bility don’t happen in taste discourse. But, as we shall see, most of them are 
morally based and are not really taste disagreements: what seems unacceptable is 
not the fact that dogs or dolphins taste good (they probably do!) but the fact 
that we have to kill them to taste them.  
21 A referee points out that in many cases, two speakers can be said to 
have agreed, disagreed, or even said the same thing, even though the standards 
that their utterances concerned were different, and the reporter was well aware 
of this. I am assuming that different standards mostly give rise to evaluative dis-
agreements such as the ones depicted above; examples of utterances of evalua-
tive sentences saying the same thing even though their parameters are different 
escape my mind, but I suggest that such cases should be considered apart, as a 
different kind of case from the one under discussion. 
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